As democratically elected president Manuel Zelaya was flying back to Honduras this morning thousands marched to the airport to welcome him. But the warm encounter never took place. Zelaya’s plane was not allowed to land by army vehicles occupying the runaway and the crowd was dispersed by security forces loyal to the de facto authorities of Honduras. The reported result is a 10-year old dead and many injured while the unlawful regime holds on to power for another day.
This is the 3rd or 4th attempt to restore the rule of law in Honduras by peaceful means. A few days ago, Secretary General of OAS, José Miguel Insulza, visited the country in a last-ditch attempt to reconcile positions before expelling Honduras from the organization. Insulza made a career in Chilean politics for his tough political intelligence in handling difficult ideological conflicts (e.g. Isulza was Chile’s minister of foreign affairs when Pinochet was arrested in London at Garzon’s request). And in this case he was able to quickly work out a unanimous repudiation of Honduras’ coup by all American countries—a remarkable achievement if one dwells on Zelaya’s affiliation with Hugo Chávez. However, the de facto authorities of Honduras have proved recalcitrant.
Though the international response has been dramatically different, the internal circumstances that have led to this coup are reminiscent of Venezuela’s 2002 coup or, going further back, of Chile’s 1973 coup. In all three cases there was a democratically elected president (cf. Chavez 1998, Allende 1970) pushing significant reforms to the constitution. The reforms are either targeted at favoring the lower classes or the government quite explicitly vows to do so and the reforms aim at perpetuating the regime. The higher classes are terrified that they are going to loose their privileges, be them legitimate or not.
The result of this conjunction of circumstances is invariably an extreme polarization of the society at hand and eventually social turmoil. In Chile it led to Pinochet’s 17-year dictatorship marked by atrocious violations of human rights. In 2002 the international conditions were significantly different and Carmona’s coup in Venezuela did not survive a week. The international conditions are even less favorable to the de facto government in Honduras but it remains to be seen if Zelaya’s popular support has enough strength to bring him back to office, as the social movement in Venezuela did with Chavez in 2002.
The case of Honduras is also important in another respect: it is the first time since the coup in Venezuela in 2002 that a Latin American country takes an unconstitutional line to resolve its own conflicts. After decades of political turmoil, it seemed that Latin America had finally found a lasting constitutional equilibrium. The coup in Honduras brings out fears of a dark past.
But it also invites reflection on the limits of democracy and its mechanisms of conflict resolution. It seems hard to contest that Zelaya’s government was democratic. However, it was partial to the poor in the social struggle between classes. The economic and political elites felt threatened and feared what they regarded as an illegitimate rewriting of the social contract. But they were outnumbered and the government would eventually be able to achieve this goal. It is understandable (though not for that reason justifiable) that the elites were going to wave their power against what they regarded as unjust and unlawful.
Because the cases of Chile, Venezuela and Honduras led to the same outcome irrespective of the diverse international conditions (cf. the coup in Chile was supported by the US) one could infer that a fracture of these dimensions at the heart of a society almost invariably leads to an unconstitutional outcome. And this is unsurprising if one looks at the problem through the lens of social contract theories. After all, cooperation is the glue that keeps society together. When different factions begin looking at each other suspiciously, not as teammates working for the well-being of all but as ruthless competitors for the scarce resources, all trust is lost. Scruples and knightliness quickly become obsolete in the game of survival and turmoil ensues.
For their own sake countries need to find social arrangements perceived as fair and beneficial by all. This is an old lesson drawn by many philosophers and political scientists since at least Rousseau. But it remains as valid as ever. Honduras confirms it once more. May Honduras learn the lesson in the light of the unfortunate events of this week.
Monday, July 6, 2009
Lessons for Honduras
Posted by Matias Bulnes at 7:50 PM
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