Check out this interview with Alex Gibney the maker of "Taxi to the Dark Side," the Oscar winning documentary on the interrogation methods used by the United States. He recounts how kids are 'trained' for a couple days and sent into interrogation rooms with little guidance but the order to extract information. Not surprisingly, the result is brutality and inhumanity.
Under controlled conditions, the transformation from a normal rights-abiding person to brutal torturing interrogator is predictable. Philip Zimbardo's Stanford Prison Experiments and his recent book, The Lucifer Effect, establish this. No doubt those who ran Abu Ghraib and the other detention centers knew this when they sent these kids to do the dirty work. The administration's explanation in terms of 'bad apples' is grounded in fiction, and merely a ruse used to escape liability.
For some details of detainee treatment, go here and here.
UPDATE: For an interview with Zimbardo go here. Warning: The interview includes a slide show of some very disturbing pictures from Abu Ghraib.
Monday, February 25, 2008
Bad apples or conditioned evil?
Are corporations psychopathic? by MT Nguyen, NYC
The conceit of the popular documentary “the Corporation” is that corporations are psychopathic. The documentary begins with the legal maneuvers used to baptize the corporation as a legal person. From there it goes through a list of psychopathic character traits (as given by the DSM, the psychiatric diagnostic manual), and applies each item to the corporation: no feelings of remorse, incapacity to feel guilt, habitual deception, inability to maintain social relationships, etc.. The documentary is rhetorically effective and the checklist is visually arresting, but is there a sense in which the truth is spoken?
There are the naysayers. Taken literally, they quip, the documentary’s conceit is obviously false and misguided. Corporations are not in fact persons, and thus cannot be ascribed psychological states like guilt or remorse. No wonder then that they cannot feel guilt or remorse! Only a confusion between, or willful conflation of, legal personhood and actual personhood could generate the rhetoric and conclusions of the movie.
But this is semantic quibbling. I’m sure no one, including the creators, really believes that corporations can feel guilt or have friends or have the intentions necessary to deception. This is true even if we are inclined in ordinary speech to refer to, for example, Enron’s lies or Arco’s uncaring explorations into the Alaskan tundra. What they surely meant is that the executives and the shareholders they represent collectively lied or are collectively negligent. While one may dispute the literal truth of these assertions by denying the existence of collectives, they are not the product of obvious confusion.
Be that as it may, there is one psychopathic-like trait on which all that we want to hang on the corporation rings true. This is the failure to take responsibility for the destructive outcomes of its decisions. This is really what grates at the corporation’s critics: the avoidance of blame, particularly when justified by the idea that corporations have no responsibilities other than to their shareholders. One question we can ask is: Is it true that this trait is part of the nature of the corporation?
One of the most influential proponents of an affirmative answer is the Nobel prize winning economist Milton Friedman. He was infamous for denying that corporations have any social responsibilities beyond increasing their profits. His reasoning relies upon a dichotomy: either be socially responsible or increase one’s profits. His argument focuses on the decisions of a CEO who is an employee of a publicly traded company. As such that CEO’s primary responsibilities are to the shareholders. If so, Friedman smugly declares, it would be illicit of her to use her powers to promote socially responsible activities at the expense of shareholder profit. He concludes that any social responsibilities, if the CEO wants to acknowledge them, should be undertaken as a private citizen and not as CEO.
In a recent speech entitled ‘Creative Capitalism’ given at the 2008 World Economic Forum, Bill Gates offered a different picture of the modern business. Following Adam Smith, Gates allows that businesses have a motive to supplement that of profit, a motive he called ‘recognition’. To be recognized, in Gates’s sense, is to be the object of another’s moral praise. A corporation’s recognition that recognition is a value makes it non-psychopathic, for it implies the non-instrumental value of other’s judgment. He offered numerous examples of how a company could utilize its unique competency to enhance the prospects of the world’s poor. Skeptics and all around nay-sayers immediately pounced upon Gates’ speech pronouncing that this is the same program which used to go by the name of Corporate Social Responsibility, which program had been, so the skeptics assert, thoroughly refuted. Whether Gates’ suggestions are new is irrelevant, but I don’t see how anything he said is self-refuting or amounts to socialism.
Assuming the recognitional motive, which responsibilities is a CEO (allegedly) failing when, in her role as leader and trustee, she directs some of the company’s research and development team to devote themselves to solving problems that their competence is specially honed to solving? True, their skills could be used to solve problems that could be applied to more lucrative markets, and that might be seen as irresponsible. But how could it be irresponsible to solve problems in third world markets when such markets bear a relationship to profit and recognition. As several recent books have argued, here and here, there is profit to be attained in setting up the right kind of services for such untapped markets. Even if there isn’t, however, the acquisition of recognition can rationalize such ventures.
This model of a business is not a wholesale reinvention of capitalism, but no doubt many would object to the fantasy they consider a corporation’s interest in recognition. A corporation’s interest is in being recognized, not in being worthy of recognition. The former is attainable through good public relations and high-priced lawyers, and doesn’t require the costs of aiming for the latter. With this maneuver we fall right back into psychopathy and its desire to want only to appear good, and not actually to be good.
But why does a corporation have to see things in this way? We might believe such a thing if we believed in the corporate version of ethical egoism. Ethical egoism is the view that whatever an individual does, she should do only as a means to maximizing her own interests. On some versions of this view, to demand someone behave altruistically is to demand she undermine herself, for in acting for others she would be literally acting self-lessly. Framed in this way, altruistic (non-egoistic) behavior is a non-starter, for a person would have no reason to act against her interests (broadly construed). Analogously, with the corporation. Its interests are whatever they are, and to demand that it behave with the view to enhancing social good is unreasonable, because that demands the company act against its interests; that is, demand that it act against itself.
This type of reasoning assumes that acting for the interests of others is incompatible with acting on one’s own interests. This is certainly false in the case of individuals. When I do something out of love for my family, I am at once acting responsibly vis-à-vis my family and enhancing my own happiness. How can that be? It is because my family’s interests are partly constitutive of my own interests: I can’t conceive of myself and what’s good for me independently of my family. This doesn’t mean that whatever interests my family has, I have as well. It does mean that I recognize a responsibility to my family’s interests, and to take them into account when I decide what to do.
An analogous case can be made about a corporation and the social environment in which it operates. Instead of seeing its interests as wholly independent of the larger community’s interests (in the case of transnational corporations, the community is essentially the world), the corporation can see them as intertwined. There is then nothing inherently contradictory about a corporation’s maximizing its profits and advancing social good at the same time. Of course, should a company refuse to see things that way, that is it’s choice. It is important to note though that it is a choice, and like all choices, one for which it can be held accountable.
But beyond the mechanisms of social blame and legal sanction, since the corporation can acknowledge reasonable options beyond maximizing profits, should it wallow in a psychopathic existence, that is the way it wants to be and not the way it that it must be. Therefore, the corporation differs from the genuine psychopath: it can hold itself accountable; the problem is it just typically refuses to do so.
Sunday, February 24, 2008
Castro Mania
Fidel Castro’s retirement has unearthed old animosities. It’s remarkable how hard it is to find any neutral commentary on his legacy and aftermath. In the American media one mostly sees herded condemnation of the Cuban Communist experience and particularly of Castro. Some do not even attempt to give an unbiased, cold-hearted account of Castro’s 49-year administration. Others try to give a more neutral appearance recalling US’s immoral policies toward Cuba, alongside Castro’s own moral flaws. But almost nowhere does one see any American medium admitting the slightest virtue in the Cuban regime. Though I’m critical of many aspects of
Since this is intended as a short piece, let me set aside
Iraqis Should Decide Whether US Stays or Goes by Joshua Livingston, NYC
Much of the original opposition to the Iraq war was based on a rejection of Bush’s doctrine of pre-emptive war. Many still do not support the war in Iraq because they continue to view it as an unjust war, and so claim we should bring our troops home. However, the original opposition seems to me an insufficient reason to justify an American exit from Iraq. Rather, if an injustice has been done, then the offending party should, if possible, make restitution or otherwise be punished. This is the argument made by many of the supporters of the surge—that as the invading force we have a moral duty to the people of Iraq to help them develop a stable civil society and functioning government. This argument applies even if you think the invasion was unjust.
Thus, if you oppose the continued occupation of Iraq, you need to rely on different arguments. For instance, you could plausibly claim that the best way to achieve stability in Iraq is for the U.S. occupation to end. Even if you admit that there will be an initial heightening of conflict, it might still be preferable in the long run for the Iraqi people to develop a government without interference from the U.S. In fact, it might be that the U.S. occupation is one of the impediments to achieving stability. Thus, if the just response by the U.S. is to help restore Iraq to some level of stability, and this is best achieved by our departure, then even if this leads to an increase of terrorism in the U.S. or threatens our access to oil in the Middle East, we should do so.
But let’s say we grant that the most effective way for Iraq to achieve stability and a functioning government is for us to continue our occupation while working towards freedom for Iraq. That still doesn’t mean that we should in fact continue the occupation. After all, the success of this way is contingent not just on our continued occupation of Iraq, but also on that occupation actually working towards Iraqi freedom. And we can’t guarantee that just because we have good intentions and so support the occupation for the right reasons that others, those who are actually in charge of the occupation, will also have those motivations. Thus, even if there is a potential for success, a continued occupation is a riskier proposition for the U.S. as it gives us greater opportunity to continue to act unjust. Since there is no strong oversight body to enforce just behavior between the U.S. and Iraq, it might be best for the U.S. to leave Iraq even if it is not the best possible way to help the Iraqi people.
In part, this is the question of whether the U.S. can be trusted to run the occupation of Iraq. From the perspective of a policy-maker the answer might seem obviously, yes. After all, she can argue that what she is proposing is not just an occupation of Iraq, but a moral occupation—one working towards restitution. Thus, if we do continue the occupation and it ends up being run by incompetents or self-interested people (or even people working towards the U.S.’s ends rather than Iraq’s), then she can simply claim that we didn’t follow her proposal (because we didn’t occupy correctly). In fact, this has been the defense of many of the original supporters of the war in Iraq. They’ve claimed that they supported the war for good reasons, but that it ended up being run in ways different than they expected, and so, even though the war ended poorly, their original proposals were still correct.
The problem with this argument is that any policy proposal has to recognize that it will be carried out by a government of many actors with varying motivations, and so you cannot always trust that they will in fact act in ways your policy proposal says they should. Thus, proposing a policy that relies on all its supporters having similar motivations increases the risk that it will fail—thus making it a worse proposal. This problem is compounded by the fact that it is the U.S. itself that decides whether or not it should be trusted to carry out the occupation. But it is all of a piece—if the U.S. can’t be trusted to do a good job of helping Iraq, we also can’t trust the U.S. to decide whether it should be trusted to occupy Iraq. It would seem then that some outside body should decide whether the U.S. should maintain its occupation of Iraq—and the most obvious candidate to make this decision would be the Iraqi people.
Friday, February 22, 2008
Perhaps a light at the end of the tunnel
Finally, some good news coming out of the Justice Department. The New York Times reports that the internal ethics office (you mean one exists?!), the Office of Professional Responsibility, at the DOJ is investigating its own justification for waterboarding.
Yes, that means you Messrs. Yoo, Bybee and Bradbury--jointly the authors, instigators and primary facilitators of various legal documents aiming to justify torture of enemy combatants. Too bad the OPR's reach doesn't extend to David Addington, Cheney's chief legal goon.
Of course, we shouldn't get our hopes up too high that anyone actually will be reprimanded or, gasp!, disbarred. But, it's still a good day.
Click here for information on the Office of Legal Counsel, that dark place where, at least during the Bush administration, justice goes to die.
Trolling for support?
After overwhelming defeat in the recent election and becoming politically isolated, Musharraf pens a rather bizarre piece with no apparent aim but to troll for US support. Of course, the Washington Post editors see it fit to offer him the forum to make his supplications.
The jig is up for the Bush/Musharraf tandem. They just can't face the music.
Wednesday, February 20, 2008
Rigged trials?
While the New York Times wastes its time tracking down monumentally unimportant news, the Nation now reports that upcoming trials for Guantanamo detainees will be rigged. Col. Morris Davis, the former chief prosecutor for military commissions at Guantanamo, relates a conversation he had with the current chief wizard of the Pentagon tribunals, William Haynes. According to Davis, Haynes said in conversation
Wait a minute, we can't have acquittals. If we've been holding these guys for so long, how can we explain letting them get off? We can't have acquittals. We've got to have convictions.Haynes reportedly said this before he became head of the tribunal process. You would think that anyone holding such opinions would not be ideal for this position. But in the up is down world of the Bush administration, it makes perfect sense. Haynes is quite a piece of work. Go here to read all the sordid details.
Putin's Spell
A decade ago I met a russian old woman who sold Red Army items in a flea market downtown Budapest. She spoke a handful of languages (remarkable vestige of the Communist education), including English. I asked her about the situation in Russia. She said that before the fall of Communism she wanted Capitalism because, like everybody, she thought she would strive under it. But after Russia's turn to Capitalism, she went on, her situation had actually worsened and she had been forced to migrate to Hungary seeking better standards of living. It was obvious, she added, that most people were going to worsen their standards of living compared to their previous Communist ones (after all, the money for inequalitites had to come from somewhere) but nobody imagined that they would be the lossers (Human nature!).
That casual conversation took place during Yeltsin's governement. Now under Putin's rule, Russians have not only lost their wealth but also democracy. Putin has been fooling democracy for years now. He's suppressed freedom of press (in practice if not in policy), intimidated his opponents, severely increased president's power (at the expense of regional power), actively hindered international watchers, and appointed to crucial offices former militaries loyal to him. The list goes on and on.
Poor Russians, they've put up with so much. And yet around 30% of Russians want Putin to continue in office by circumventing the constitution. Something's wrong with Russia and the numbers do not give the answer (Russia has fallen from 2nd to 13th in economic performance in the post-Soviet region). Another sign that the world's future looks gloomy.
Tuesday, February 19, 2008
Castro retires
As probably everyone has already heard, today Castro announced his retirement. Can this be the beginning of a sane U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba? I'm not holding my breath and certainly it won't happen under Bush, but perhaps reason can make a comeback under Obama or Clinton. Or perhaps Cuba's ties to Chavez will be the downfall of potential normalization.
Do our friends in South America have any insight into such matters?
UPDATE: Evidently, there are meaningful differences between Obama's and Clinton's stances to Cuba. The Nation chimes in here.
Desire and mechanisms of cruelty
I hope to say more in the future about appetitive desires and the amoral mechanisms we've set up to satisfy them, but two recent news items bring the topic to the forefront for me. I linked to the story about Valentine's Day and our cocoa supply below. Yesterday, the USDA recalled 143 million pounds of beef. As staggering as that number seems, it represents only 2 years worth of 1 California manufacturer's production.
Upon hearing about the recall, my first thought turned to the sheer wastefulness of it. I don't mean in terms of the market value of beef, but rather in terms of the animals' lives. I don't believe it is morally wrong to consume beef, but our seemingly insatiable desire for it has led to forms of cruelty. We are almost wholly shielded from all this. In fact, the beef recall was precipitated by a secretly filmed video inside of a slaughterhouse. I've seen the video and I can't imagine how anyone can fail to recognize the cruelty exhibited in it. Let's suppose I'm right about that. Assuming that there is some causal connection between the way our livestock is mishandled and our insatiable demand for cheap beef, shouldn't we see it as our responsibility to curb our appetites?
Friday, February 15, 2008
American Anti-Intellectualism
Anyone who has some acquiantance with countries other than the US has probably noticed a handful of particularities about Americans that set them apart from the rest of the world. One of them is that Americans, in average, are unusually ignorant. Living in this world may hinder appreciation of how weird it is. Unlike any other time in history, the most powerful country in the world has the best high-education system, produces some of the smartest people in the world and when not, brings over some of the smartest foreigners to work with its own thinkers. And yet they all live surrounded but people who don't know that Europe isn't a country or that France is. The gap in wealth in the US, so often discussed, could be considered a little crack compared to the gap in knowledge.
Actually the problem is more serious. It's not just that Americans in average are unusually ignorant but they hate people who are not. Or conversely, so often does one see people in the US taking pride in not knowing things (Cf. TV stereotypes like the stupid-but-hot blonde). And it sometimes becomes agressive, like when people feel threatened by someone who has a vocabulary larger than a few hundred words. They complain "why are you using such big words" as if one were cheating.
Oftentimes intellectuals (American or otherwise) overplay American anti-intellectualism because they can't relate to it. But, in fact, it can be dangerous for the US if only because it does not welcome smart people (and other things being equal, more smart people is better than less). At the very least there's thinking to be done on the issue and we celebrate recent attempts to understand the phenomenon.
Thursday, February 14, 2008
Rule of law redux
Senate Judiciary Chairman, John Conyers (D-Mich)
Now playing in a separate arena: the constitutional powers game. Amidst all the scandals of the past week or so, the House's contempt citations reminded me of the U.S. Attorney firings scandal of a few months ago.
According to White House press secretary, Dana Marino
The American people will find it baffling that on a day that House leaders are trying to put off passing critical legislation to keep us safer from the threat of foreign terrorists overseas, they are spending scarce time to become the first Congress in history to bring contempt charges against a president’s chief of staff and lawyer.
If the House had nothing better to do, this futile partisan act would be a waste of time. Unbelievably, it is being considered in place of legislation to make us safer, address concerns in the housing market, improve health care conditions for our veterans, reauthorize No Child Left Behind or open new overseas markets for U.S. goods and services, among other bills. The 'people’s House' should reflect the priorities of the American people, not the fantasies of left-wing bloggers.
Yes, the left-wing blogosphere is indeed a powerful constituency?!
In a more moderate tone, John Conyers asserted,
Unfortunately, it is a step that is clearly necessary to preserve the role and constitutional prerogatives of Congress as an institution, in addition to getting to the bottom of the U.S. attorney controversy. If the executive branch can disregard congressional subpoenas in this way, we no longer have a system of checks and balances. That is the cornerstone of our democracy, and it is our bipartisan responsibility to protect it.Conyers statement brings us back to our defense of the rule of law.
The Bush administration seems to be making the substantive judgment that security concerns outweigh the concerns about the firings. Let us grant that that judgment is correct. As Conyers rightly points out, however, the House handed out contempt citations for a far broader and more important reason than to discover who did what to whom: the ultimate reason rests on the need to have an accountable executive branch. We are reminded that when the Senate Judicial Committee handed out subpeonas for Harriet Miers and Josh Bolton to testify, upon Bush's direction they simply ignored it (citing executive privilege). Even if we don't care at all about this particular scandal, many recognize the good in having a principed solution to this power game.
But perhaps I am mistaken and it is better that balance of power struggles remain a power game. Are there opinions about this?
Can Valentine's be bad for labor?
A surprising (to me) affirmative answer:
Labour rights campaigners will take some of the romance out of Valentine’s Day on Thursday by warning lovers that their traditional gifts of flowers and chocolates are often bought at an intolerable cost to those who produce them.Go here to read the rest.
How (not) to Respond to Terrorism?
It's been confirmed that Imad Mugniyah was killed by a bomb in Damascus. He was widely considered a dangerous terrorist hence his death has been celebrated by many, including US officials. True, the fewer terrorists the better. But there's something unsettling about the event: some suspect Israel of perpetrating the attack. If this were true, it would set a very dangerous precedent. For this kind of actions, when perpetrated by states, legitimizes international terrorism. Let's hope (probably in vain) that should the suspicion be confirmed, in addition to celebrating the incapacitation of one more terrorist the international community (including the US, of course) will condemn the method for achieving the goal.
Wednesday, February 13, 2008
Senate bans waterboarding
The Senate votes 51-45 to pass bill containing a ban on waterboarding. More specifically, it restricts the CIA to using interrogation methods listed in the Army Field Manual, which manual specifically prohibits waterboarding. There is good discussion of this over at Balkinization.
For members of the Senate who voted against the bill, go here (note especially, McCain). He'll have some explaining to do.
We await the inevitable Bush veto.
UPDATE: McCain explains. Basically, he voted against the bill not because it opposed waterboarding (which he opposes), but because it restricts the CIA to a specific list of interrogation techniques. He believes the CIA should be able to use techniques beyond those allowed for the armed forces. We don't know what those techniques are, but the basic criterion he applies is 'cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment.' On his view, waterboarding meets this criterion and should be banned. So, he is not flatly contradicting himself. The issue is whether the criterion he employs is sufficient to prohibit the activities we want to prohibit. Evidently not, since the current administration does not believe waterboarding meets the criterion; it doesn't 'shock the conscience' as they put it. But perhaps we shouldn't lay this at McCain's door. We should consider his criterion defective only if it leaves open a reasonable interpretation which allows for waterboarding. However, no one, perhaps even including the administration itself, sincerely believes waterboarding is not cruel, inhumane and degrading.
Now, it is a separate question whether McCain voted correctly. Given the opportunity to ban a morally reprehensible technique (which Bush flatly says he'll use again if he sees the need), McCain chose not to because he thought it would unduly restrict the CIA from using techniques it should be able to use. Such techniques, although not explicitly stated, would include, presumably, stress positions, sleep deprivation, and other things we've seen from Abu Ghraib. Leaving aside the question whether those techniques violate the criterion, we can ask whether permitting them is worth the reality of permitting waterboarding. This question is difficult to answer because there is so little known about what useful intelligence has been actually gained from their use. Bush claims that their use has yielded life-saving intelligence. For the sake of argument, let's say he is telling the truth (gasp!). Can it be shown that the same life-saving intelligence couldn't have been yielded using only the techniques contained in the Army Field Manual?
Rule of law objections against retroactive immunity
Yesterday, the Senate (by a 68-29 margin!) shamefully endorsed retroactive immunity for those telecom companies which helped the government to illegally wiretap domestic calls.
Whether one believes that the government did the right thing (in the moral sense) in wiretapping our calls or the phone companies did the right thing (in the moral sense) to consent is one matter. It is a difficult question, in my opinion, whether such invasions of citizens’ presumption of privacy are justifiable in light of the dangers we face. One route towards a negative answer is to point out, as many have, that FISA’s restrictions on government wiretapping were not stringent (out of nearly 20,000 requests for warrants the FISA courts have rejected only 5). This belies any assertion that emergency conditions and immanent dangers demanded that government act without a warrant. This is not to mention that wiretapping has continued for 5 years now, and probably would have remained a secret had the NY Times, in a rare act of courage, not exposed the program. Be that as it may, my main point here is just to say that an answer to who is right or wrong in such matters requires making substantive judgments of value.
A concern for the rule of law, however, is different. Respect for the rule of law is respect for the procedures the law encodes. Whether or not one believes the government and the telecom companies made a substantive mistake or not, it is a fairly straightforward judgment to say that they violated the rule of law. With the 1978 FISA law in place, Bush unilaterally decided that it didn’t apply to him and thereby directed ATT and Verizon (and who knows what other companies) to spy on their customers. This is a violation of the rule of law plain and simple.
We cannot underestimate the value that rule of law constraints have in a functioning democracy. Arguably, since liberal democracies should be neutral with regards to moral value, the rule of law is the most fundamental political value we have. The contempt with which the Bush administration has treated this value is well known. It serially substitutes its own judgment for laws that previous administrations working with previous congresses have carefully crafted.
With yesterday’s vote, the Senate has now endorsed such lawlessness—and this is a source of deep disappointment for anyone who, perhaps wishfully, believed that this body possesses the institutional wisdom to confront an evisceration of the rule of law. Pitifully, some members of Senate are now praying that the House manages to do what the Senate should have done.
For an eloquent, but evidently ineffective, defense of the rule of law, read Senator Dodd’s (D-CT) statement.
Tuesday, February 12, 2008
Inequality and Consumption by Ornaith O'Dowd, NYC
Sunday's New York Times featured an extraordinary opinion piece titled "You Are What You Spend" by Michael Cox and Richard Alm, both of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. In it, Cox and Alm argue that the gap between rich and poor in the United States has been substantially overstated because it has been measured in terms of income rather than consumption. They grant the obvious, namely, that income inequality has been increasing since the 1970s. However, they say, we really shouldn't complain so much: what really matters is relative levels of consumption.
It turns out that the top fifth of households consumes on average only 2.1 times per person more than that among the bottom fifth: hey, nothing to worry about! (The average income of the top fifth is, according to their figures, over fifteen times that of the bottom fifth.) "The bottom fifth [of U.S. households] earned [in 2006] just $9,974, but spent nearly twice that-- an average of $18,153 a year. How is that possible?" they ask.
How indeed, we might pertinently ask, as the debt crisis devastates family after family, neighborhood after neighborhood. It seems, according to Cox and Alm, that poor families have sources of money other than taxable income, including sales of property and cars, and the cashing in of insurance policies. What sort of desperation might be involved in a decision to cash an insurance policy or to sell your house before the bank gets there first? These authors don’t consider this question. But, being poor means, among other things, having to make hard choices that the rich will never have to think about.
Cox and Alm mention that what is left over of the top fifth's earnings after spending on transportation, food, shelter, clothing, and so on, goes to taxes and savings. (They don't mention the sources of money other than income that they might have.)
Now, Cox and Alm tell us that there is a further difficulty for those arguing that the wealth gap is a serious and growing problem: VCRs (VCRs? Seriously!), computers, and cars have become cheaper. It requires less and less labor time to earn the money to buy them. So, even though the average worker is earning less in real terms now than in the 1970s as wages have failed to keep pace with inflation, we can more easily afford a computer now than then. Stuff is cheaper, thanks to "free trade"! Therefore, since it is making everyone better off, why stand in its way?
I won’t talk about the vicious consequences of "free trade" for the workers who make all this wonderful cheap stuff (that's enough of an argument against "free trade" in itself). Neither will I address the well-founded claim that we are, in the US, consuming too much all told: we are clearly heading for environmental disaster in that respect, but structural inequalities of consumption built into capitalism matter a great deal for that argument, too. That deserves a posting (or thousand) on its own, though.
Let's examine the terms of the argument itself. So a computer is more affordable now than in the 1970s. This sort of thing happens all the time: think of how cars were at first playthings of the elite, and then became affordable for working people, and in many parts of this highway-choked country are now basic necessities. The level of technology considered a normal part of everyday life has generally increased: that's what happens when technology advances and society absorbs it and builds it into its expectations. Having a phone, or electric lighting, or an indoor toilet, are now considered absolutely basic necessities for people in the United States, but once, of course, they were not. Computer and internet access are following in the footsteps of the phone: soon we will expect everyone to have them, and will organize society accordingly. It is already happening, of course. Imagine the reactions you would get if you didn't have a phone in this country: how am I supposed to reach you? What do you mean you don't have a phone number? It's a required field in the application form!
As we bask in the knowledge that the poor might (gasp!) have phones and computers like everyone else, let us think about where the expectations of the rich have gone in the meantime. You guessed it: up. They live in gated communities, or Manhattan; they fly to Italy or the Maldives for friends' weddings; they can afford organic food and milk that does not contain rBGH; they enjoy the best healthcare in the world and want to live at least a century. In other words, the same old story: where the market rules, the rich get richer and the poor do fall behind.
Poverty is not just about consumption, although it is about that to be sure (Cox and Alms didn't mention "consumption" of healthcare, for example-- as everyone knows, fewer and fewer workers have employer-provided health cover, and they face increasing healthcare costs)-- it is also about a terrible lack of security. What if I get sick? What if my partner dies? What if I lose my job? What if I can't afford to retire? My computer won't be much help then. The savings the rich pile away are not just idle in this sense then, they provide something very valuable indeed.
Poverty is about something else, too: status. In a hierarchical society like the US, class and poverty, in combination with race, gender, dis/ability, and sexuality (yes, in spite of the Will and Grace stereotype, not all queers are rich white men), structure your social and political experience in profound ways. What gets determined is simply and brutally whether you matter or not. This isn't news, but it is worth remembering every time you read that inequality really isn't that bad.
Can we prosecute waterboarders and those who gave them legal advice?
Go here for the most sophisticated take on this issue I've seen.
I don't agree with his conclusions, but his arguments need to be addressed.
One basic issue, I take it, is the permissibility (moral and legal) of retroactive prosecution: can someone be punished now for doing what was legal at the time he did it?
Of course, many deny that waterboarding can ever be legal, but the sticking point is that the Bush and his administration's Office of Legal Cousel (OLC) construed it as such.
Are we in natural law territory: an unjust law is no law at all, and a fortiori unreasonable to obey? If so, the waterboarders who listened to the OLC's advice should have known better and were being unreasonable in doing what they were told to do. Consequently, they are liable to sanctions.
Monday, February 11, 2008
The face of evil?
Even Nietzsche might have called Duch (born, Kang Khek Ieu) evil. He was the Khmer Rouge's chief interrogator, torturer and executioner of the Cambodian intelligentsia (from 1975-1979), and in a recent interview he reminisced:
I and everyone else who worked in that place knew that anyone who entered had to be psychologically demolished, eliminated by steady work, given no way out. No answer could avoid death. Nobody who came to us had any chance of saving himself.Click here to read snippets from that interview with the "Cambodian Himmler."
After many years of negotiations, he and other senior Khmer Rouge leaders soon will be tried.
I've exerted a good deal of intellectual energy reading and reflecting on evil, but there is simply nothing that comes close to accounting for its existence and expression. In the interview, Duch appears to suggest that fear (for himself and particularly his family, who he claims was held hostage) motivated him to do what he did. Duch has since found Christianity, and this retrospective rationalization is an evident attempt to disassociate his present self from his past incarnation. This is all well and good, but does nothing to explain his mindset in Democratic Kampuchea circa 1975.
Unlike Eichmann's, Duch's activities and the innovation and zeal with which he approached his duties, cannot be characterized as banal.
How should they be characterized?
Obama and the Baby Boomers by Matias Bulnes, NYC
In a recent article titled "Goodbye to All That: Why Obama Matters" Andrew Sullivan argues that US politics has been the battlefield for an ideological war. This war is the product of a clash of cultures that began (or at least popped up to public significance) with the Vietnam War as a youthful rebellion against traditional Christian values (hence Sullivan’s appellative “baby boomers”). According to Sullivan, the conflict has carried along to our days and now it appears as the divide between Republicans and Democrats, between the religious and the secular, the pro-life and the pro-choice, the tax-cutters and the health carers, the design arguers and the evolutionary theorists, the science censors and the stem-cell researches, the global coolers and the global warmers, the infinite justicers and the troop withdrawers. Sullivan’s implicit thesis is that the unbridgeable worldviews of hippies and snobs from the 60s and 70s account for much of the current divide in American society.
And this may well be so. My disagreement with Sullivan isn’t over the present or past but over the future. And even then I believe I disagree more on the tone than on the wording. He sees Obama as a potential conciliator between baby boomers whereas I don’t see much reason to see this. I agree that Obama is an exciting figure who can potentially become a turning point in American history. But not by conciliating between the baby boomers because, to my grief, I think that the baby boomers are really unbridgeable, not metaphorically. Let me explain why.
The disagreements between the two trenches of baby boomers are not superficial but deep, fundamental. As Sullivan himself observes, a quick look at the programs of the various contenders for the looming presidential election will reveal more similarities than contrasts. To recount a few, at this point all the candidates agree that the war in Iraq has got a little out of hands and that the troops should be withdrawn; their divergences arise over when and how. On health care there are disagreements, but as Sullivan himself points out, they are far from overwhelming. Regarding fiscal policies, the agreements are vast and well-known. Let alone civil rights where even some republican candidates propose a quick end for Guantanamo-like abuses.
So where are the disagreements? They are beneath the surface and yet visible. I believe the crux is God, but more importantly the conceptions of society they derive from that. If this is correct, such an amount of superficial agreement should not surprise us because, after all, their moral values coincide in bulk: they all believe in honesty, gentleness, persistence, honor; and they all disbelieve in greed, arrogance, ruthlessness, etc. It’s their justification for such beliefs that sets them apart. The ones think that God and the Bible straightforwardly provide the justification; the others think it’s reason—whatever religious beliefs they might also have.
Baby boomers can find over and over again middle grounds upon which to continue to play the game, but the tensions will not go away. For wherever there’s massive disagreement over the justification there’s conflict looming. It’s just a matter of time for a new issue to pop up that will strike them in opposite ways. And no amount of conciliation will change this. For no matter how the old issues are settled, the fundamental disagreement will remain. Thus despite the abortion issue being seemingly settled and relatively quiet, the discord has found its way back to center stage with stem-cell research.
But we should not be uneasy because there are disagreements, for all countries have their own and this is a mark of healthy politics. What’s worrisome is the nature of the disagreement at the heart of American society. I think that in the end baby boomers disagree over what society they live in or, in any case, what society they should live in. Ultimately, it’s a matter of secularism versus religiosity.
A useful way of looking at the issue is through the lens of Rawls’ conception of the modern democratic society. According to Rawls, such a society would be one in which all members restrict their fundamental conceptions of the good to their private sphere. Everybody can privately worship whatever gods or icons they want, but in the public arena the rules of interaction and argumentation are neutral with regard to those private beliefs: reason alone moderates public debate. Appeals to omnicomprehensive worldviews (such as some religious ones) in debates over how to pursue the public good are illegitimate and unacceptable. People holding various such worldviews cannot coexist in a Rawlsian society.
While the Rawlsian picture of the modern democratic society interprets one trench in the war between baby boomers, the other trench identifies with an omnicomprehensive worldview. This is evident in the debate over stem-cell research where one side of the debate is worried about the earthly consequences of stem-cell research (such as curing terrible diseases) while the other cannot help seeing the project as intruding on God’s plan. Who’s right and who’s wrong is not my concern here. What’s important for the point I want to make is that the conflict between these views of society is not about to subside because 1) they contradict each other (hence no reconciliation is possible); and 2) these views are constitutive of the identities of the parties (hence no chance they’ll give them up).
The irreconcilability of the two trenches of baby boomers can also be brought out by considering what it would take to bridge them. Should Obama be a conciliator between baby boomers he would have to induce dialog between the parties. The conversation would eventually turn on the fundamental disagreement, that is, what is and what is not a legitimate argument in public debate. But then again they would find themselves talking past each other for neither party would accept the reasons provided by the other. To be able to settle disagreements the parties have to at least agree on a basic framework of argumentation. Since baby boomers disagree precisely over what counts as a legitimate argument, no reconciliation is possible.
So Obama will not bridge the gap between baby boomers lying at the heart of American society simply because the gap is unbridgeable. The only hope that the conflict will go away is that the parties will go away. So for those who find the conflict dangerous for American society, let’s hope that the new generations won’t be trooped along the same standards. I think this is Obama’s aura: not so much that he can conciliate between the old foes, but that he could potentially mark the beginning of the new ones.
Do Clinton and Obama differ on foreign policy?
One route towards a positive answer:
...the kind of people the next president appoints to top positions in national defense, intelligence, and foreign affairs is critical. Such officials usually emerge from among a presidential candidate’s team of foreign policy advisors. So, analyzing who these two finalists for the Democratic presidential nomination have brought in to advise them on international affairs can be an important barometer for determining what kind for foreign policies they would pursue as president,writes Stephen Zunes. Click here to read the remainder of his illuminating article.
S. Korean national treasure destroyed in fire
A departure from our usual focus, but I wanted to highlight this. 
The 600 year old gate in its glory.
Sunday, February 10, 2008
Death penalty sought for 9/11 detainees
The New York Times reports that military prosecutors will bring charges against 6 Guantanamo detainees implicated in the 9/11 attack. They will seek the death penalty. This will further complicate the legal situation and obviously bring world wide scrutiny.
In a related matter, Times reporter Linda Greenhouse reports that the Bush administration will seek emergency SCOTUS review of detainee cases revolving around the general issue of enemy combatant designation.
Not surprisingly, the administration asserts that court review of such designation must proceed without all the relevant information, for divulging all such information would threaten national security.
The gatekeepers of the law are at it again.
Endorsing Obama
For skeptics and all around nay-sayers, the Nation's editors paint a moderately persuasive picture endorsing Obama's candidacy.
A Kafkaesque conception of the rule of law
Franz Kafka's The Trial contains a famous parable in which a simple countryman attempts to gain 'entrance into the Law,' only to spend his life rebuffed by a series of increasingly powerful gatekeepers. He eventually passes away never knowing the law's meaning, source or authority.
In today's editorial, The New York Times tells a similar story concerning the legal standing of our government's wiretapping and waterboarding programs.
If anyone wishes to investigate the legality of these programs, our gatekeeper, Michael Mukasey, confirms their legality and rebuffs calls for investigation. When asked how he knows, his response was that the Justice Department, prior to his tenure, asserted their legality. Such confidence is striking, to say the least, given the president’s refusal to release documents essential to understanding the legal judgment.
The editorial makes clear that the executive branch’s obfuscations are being echoed by the Senate. That is, the Senate also functions as the gatekeeper to the Law.
This is what passes for the rule of law nowadays.
Saturday, February 9, 2008
Here is an intelligent article on withdrawal from Iraq, including poll numbers expressing Iraqi public opinion.
Friday, February 8, 2008
Private contractors
I will take up the idea of corporate responsibilities in a later post, but I wanted to pose the following for discussion.
CIA Chief Michael Hayden confirmed this week the use of private contractors in the interrogation of 3 waterboarded detainees.
Now, Milton Friedman famously argued in a NY Times column that corporations have no social responsibility but to increase their profits; many others have avowed this position. Is it an implication of this view that those private corporations involved in waterboarding bear no responsibility? They were just doing what they should, increasing their profits?
Is this what Hannah Arendt meant by the banality of evil?
Torture is not torture: Bush's logic
Washington Post editorial board calls out the Bush administration's stance on waterboarding.
Thursday, February 7, 2008
Facilitating extraordinary rendition
Last year, the ACLU filed a law suit against Jeppesen Dataplan charging that it facilitated an illegal activity, namely, our government's extraordinary rendition program.
Demonstrating the courage of its convictions, a Justice Department lawyer argued to a federal judge recently that pursuit of this lawsuit would risk divulging state secrets. In other words, although it is a conviction that rendition is justifiable, no justification of it can be publicized--even to the judiciary.
I want to leave aside the extraordinariness of this line of reasoning to ask a different question: to what extent should a company be legally culpable of intentionally facilitating immoral (and, we can add legally questionable) governmental activities, which facilitation is requested, perhaps even demanded, by the government itself? This case poses a greater problem than the one involving the question of immunity for the telecommunications industry now facing the Senate. It does so because facilitating torture (in this case, providing transportation to CIA 'black sites') is patently wrong, while facilitating spying is not (or not necessarily).
What do people think?
Wednesday, February 6, 2008
The zenith of shamelessness
Yesterday, the CIA, evidently with presidential authorization, officially announced its use of waterboarding. Today, evidently with no regret, the White House defended its actions, thereby marking the zenith of shamelessness. Moreover, through his spokesman, our president clarified the content of his character by announcing that future use of waterboarding would remain a legal and moral option. The reputation of our shining City upon a Hill has thereby reached a nadir. We need not be Christians to take lesson from John Winthrop's warning of the consequences of moral failing in the New World:
The eyes of all people are upon us. So that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken, and so cause Him to withdraw His present help from us, we shall be made a story and a by-word through the world. We shall open the mouths of enemies to speak evil of the ways of God, and all professors for God's sake. We shall shame the faces of many of God's worthy servants, and cause their prayers to be turned into curses upon us till we be consumed out of the good land whither we are going (John Winthrop, 1630).Indeed.
Tuesday, February 5, 2008
Who is the decider? by MT Nguyen, NYC
President Bush is notorious for saying that he is the decider. This raises more than a few questions, but one essential question, both for politics and the constitution, is on what grounds and to what scope is he the decider. The question is of great importance because it touches upon the most controversial aspects of the current administration’s actions: its policy on detainee treatment, the existence of Guantanamo Bay, wiretapping of domestic communications, the extensive use of executive signing statements, etc..
There exists a limited consensus on the question of scope. For example, there are widely accepted limitations on the executive’s powers, particularly involving the balance of its powers in relation to the powers inherent to congress [Click here for case]. And there are widely accepted restrictions on certain exercises of executive power, for example, certain claims to executive privilege [Click here for case]. Other limitations have proven more controversial, in particular, the executive’s powers in times of war. One gets the impression that Bush and his supporters believe that, in times of war, he is the decider on all matters requiring decision. One can question whether this is true, and this question relates to a very old question extending beyond a parochial concern for the US constitution. This is the question of the grounds of political authority.
But we can begin with the constitution, because the debate is often framed by conflicting claims about what the constitution asserts: some have decried what they see as Bush’s shameless unconstitutional power grab, while others recognize in his actions a more principled reassertion of the executive’s rightful constitutional powers. The constitution itself, particularly Article II, articulates the broad powers and responsibilities of the executive, and we would hope to find therein a clear statement of the scope of executive authority. However, we are disappointed if we believe a careful reading will resolve our current disputes. Although the executive is commander in chief of the army and navy, it does not follow that sole authority over the army and navy is vested in the executive. Congress, for example, with its powers of advice and consent authorizes the use of the armed forces.
Constitutional answers to other questions are difficult to locate. Can Bush rightfully deploy forces to guard and maintain a prison camp without the express approval of Congress? Can military tribunals try and convict non-military citizens without the express approval of Congress? As constitutional questions, the answers rest on whether such actions fall exclusively within the purview of the commander in chief. Unfortunately, for anything the constitution explicitly asserts, there are plausible answers on both sides. Since the commander in chief should have wide latitude with respect to military decisions, and these are military decisions, the answers could be positive on both counts. On the other hand, the commander’s latitude to decide over a matter is possible only when such matters are construed, via congressional authorization, as military; in the absence of such, the executive is overreaching and treating a civilian matter as a military one. If so, the answers could be negative on both counts. Looking only to the constitution, we are left dangling.
If we want to know whether a particular exercise of executive authority is justifiable, we must have an independent normative conception of the rightful exercises of political authority. No legal document alone can decide this, for the morality of the document can always be put into question.
Focusing solely on the context of the executive’s authority in times of emergency (e.g. war), we can ask whether any plausible normative conception of political authority can justify undisturbed discretion to make decisions. I take up this extreme case because that is the thesis some want to defend, namely: in times of emergency, the judiciary and legislative branches should give great (more or less complete) deference to the executive. That is, in Bush’s words, in matters of war, he is the decider. What could ground such an extreme picture?
In their recent book, Terror in the Balance, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that theoretical competence justifies this degree of deference. In particular, the executive is, given his authority over the intelligence community, better placed than the other branches to deliberate and decide on matters of national security. In emergency conditions (which, it should be noted, they believe hold now and indefinitely into the future), its superior theoretical competence shouldn’t be questioned by institutions not well equipped, or equipped at all, to deliberate in this domain. Second guessing decisions from experts predictably leads to relatively worse outcomes.
Leaving aside the empirical question whether the executive branch indeed has the relatively superior theoretic competence they claim, I want to focus on the concept of theoretical competence and whether it is suited to justify what many deem to be the Bush administration’s moral excesses. I believe it is not.
The thought that theoretic competence justifies authority rests on the old idea that knowledge or justified belief is the surest route to making the right decisions. Of course, that is true if the only considerations in play are factual ones. For example, in looking for a diagnosis of an illness, if getting well is an unquestioned good, turning to the expert in medicine is rational. The expert is instrumental to getting what I want. Once given the diagnosis, it is defeats the very purpose of seeking an expert to then engage in second guessing. Even if the expert turns out to be wrong, the decision to accept the expert’s (the authority) diagnosis is rational. So far so good.
However, if the deliberative field changes to include normative considerations about what is good and bad for me all things considered, the theoretic expert, while still useful, cannot be decisive to the rationality of my decision. If the doctor tells me I have high blood pressure and should therefore exercise and eat less salt, his authority extends only to the factual claim and not the normative one. That is, whether I decide to exercise depends upon whether, considering all the reasons which apply to me, the balance of reasons falls in favor of doing so. The theoretic authority cannot decide that for me. I need not, and arguably should not, defer to the doctor’s authority with respect to that question.
These considerations bear on the question of what powers the executive should have in emergency conditions. Posner and Vermeule argue that theoretic competence justifies great and (more or less) unchecked executive powers. However, even if it is true that the executive is the relative expert in matters of national security, that alone cannot decide the question of whether, for example, torturing detainees is a good idea. The good in question is not merely technical or instrumental, e.g. the question whether torturing elicits useful information, but normative. That is, we want to know also, and more importantly, whether torture is an activity we can live with, and whether it expresses who we are as a nation. These are ethical questions. We can leave technical matters to the technical experts, but we should not leave deliberation on ethical questions to them. Deliberation on such questions is up to all of us. More specifically, congress and the judiciary should play a major role in shaping our political stance on these important ethical questions. It would be an absolute failure to live up to their responsibilities for these two institutions to defer to the executive. If it should appear that in questions of life and death, the technical question of how to preserve life acts an ethical trump, that is only because we often make the judgment that life is worth preserving. That judgment is not always decisive however (as Socrates long pointed out), and at any rate, whether it is or not should not be decided only by those with knowledge of technical facts.
I conclude then that the authority to deliberate on ethical questions rests with all three branches—in these important matters, there is no one decider.
Saturday, February 2, 2008
Are we all responsible? by Matias Bulnes, NYC
Over the last few years we have witnessed a number of measures carried out by George W. Bush’s administration in the name of US national security. To say the least, some of these measures lay on the verge of the overtly immoral and arguably illegal. It defies reason that some people react with surprise to accusations against Bush’s government of using or endorsing illegitimate means to pursue its political ends. I might conceive (although not without difficulty) that such accusations could end up being dismissed upon serious debate. But it just escapes my imagination that the denial of both prisoner’s rights and habeas corpus to those hitherto suspects of terrorism held in Guantanamo could be considered routinely moral and legal. That’s like trying to hide the sun with one finger.
But I do not intend to raise accusations already made. The point I want to make here surpasses Bush’s administration and even surpasses the US and the present time. I’m concerned with the role of citizens as passive witnesses of actions they find heinous done in their name and under their authorization. I’m concerned with our political responsibility as passive witnesses of atrocities being done in our name by our government.
Many of us are of the opinion that some of Bush’s measures to fight the Islamic threat are immoral. In fact, I daresay that most of us believe that the immorality of the situation in Guantanamo or of the recently uncovered Extraordinary Rendition policy is simply incontestable. But fewer would voice their opinion publicly and even fewer do anything to actively hinder these allegedly hideous actions. We rather turn to the comfort of our homes and personal lives than having to face the uncritical mob of Bush’s supporters.
Convenient though it is, this passiveness does not free us of political responsibility. After all, we all participate in this tacit contract we call the US society which defines the roles each of us plays in the political structure, including the democratically elected authorities—in particular, the federal government. In virtue of this tacit contract, the government’s authority to do everything it does comes from each one of us for as long as it does it in our name, that is, for as long as the government is uncorrupted and democratic. Since I want to believe that Bush’s government is uncorrupted, I shall believe that it does what it does in my name and under my tacit authorization. And if I’m partially the source of its political authority and power, I must accept a share of the political responsibility in its actions.
And so must all citizens; even those who didn’t vote for Bush. For it is essential to a democratic system that the state must be neutral with regard to the various subgroups within the society, be them religious, political, etc. All citizens should (and expect to) count the same in the government’s motivation to pursue the well-being of the nation, regardless of their political affiliation and so regardless of whether they voted for it. Hence, it is implicit in a democratic system that supporters and opponents of the government are to the same extent the partial reason of the government’s actions and so they all are in an important sense responsible for them.
I think that we have recognized this fact in the recent history. After World War II, Germany as a whole, not only Hitler’s supporters, undertook political sanctions for the Holocaust. And in fact it would have seemed unjust if those passive witnesses of the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime went unpunished. For oftentimes their apathy was not rooted in ignorance of Hitler’s extreme views but in the comfort of knowing themselves to be the ultimate beneficiaries of Hitler’s political and military actions. The political structure they willingly participated in makes them be better described as accomplices than innocent witnesses.
This is not, of course, to say that all members of a society have the exact same degree of responsibility in the actions of their government. In fact, there can be little doubt that some members of the Bush administration have a double share of responsibility: like all US citizens, for participating in the social contract; and unlike most US citizens, for having devised such hideous ways of pursuing the well-being of the US. In general, supporters of Bush’s questionable policies differ from apathetic citizens in that they facilitate the political climate to conduct such policies. Hence, they seem to be more responsible, though not the only ones responsible.
Now one thing is to bear responsibility on a certain immoral action; another quite different is to deserve to die for it. In no way do I want to suggest that the responsibility borne by an average American gives Islamic terrorists the right to kill her, as in fact they did on 9/11. For one thing, though I’m inclined to think that non-combatants should never be targeted by military forces there is a whole literature on this issue and I’m not prepared to defend any position. For another, I don’t want to begin to loose the tenure I’m yet to get before I even go out to the job market—as similar suggestions prompted Ward Churchill’s loss of his tenure.
But whatever our moral desert, the important question is how to get rid of the responsibility that yields it. And it should seem indeed very tragic if breaking the social contract were our only chance. For as far as I can see, individuals can break the contract in one of two ways: renouncing their citizenship and moving to another country; or acting in ways that explicitly violate their political duties. Both seem unreasonable and what’s worse, both seem to no avail.
Is it then in our fate to carry this moral burden? No, if the previous analysis is correct. Recall that the source of our basic responsibility is our being in some important sense the partial reason for these actions, in virtue of the tacit social contract we participate in. Hence becoming at the same time a reason against these courses of action within the limits of the social contract should counteract the basic responsibility. If, for example, an individual were to participate in legitimate public demonstrations against those actions, if she were to articulate and express cogent reasons against them, or if only she publicly expressed her dissent, all the same she would be giving the government reasons, political and/or moral, not to pursue those courses of action. Should an individual do this with enough eagerness, at the end of the day it would seem unjust to blame her for the outcomes, even if her efforts did not suffice to stop the immoral actions.
In sum, I believe there is hope for us moral citizens who deem Bush’s actions illegitimate. Not only do we have a chance to purge our guilt but it is our moral duty to do so. I have written this article as an attempt to fulfill mine.
Statement
Terrorism, we’re told, demands quietism. In the aftermath of 9/11 White House press secretary Ari Fleisher sought quietism through the chilling effect of an executively authorized declaration: Americans should watch what they say, what they do.
We say that the underlying viciousness of such forms of coercive power needs to be confronted. We believe we have a responsibility to confront such vice, for the worst kind of quietism is voluntary. This responsibility is grounded in at least two ways. First, most of what our governments do, for good or bad, they do as our representatives. Does it matter whether we actually voted for any particular administration? Those who voted for, and supported thereafter, any particular government are in a straightforward way causally responsible, but this does not absolve those who voted differently or not at all. All citizens voluntarily falling under the rule of any democratically elected administration tacitly legitimize such rule. Either directly or indirectly, then, we all legitimize their actions, and must bear responsibility for such legitimization.
Second, independently of our own governments, we believe being human carries its own responsibilities. Institutional policies, we see, often have horrific outcomes, especially and disproportionately so, for the world’s poor. The widespread, and widely known, shortfalls in access to the objects of human rights represent an intolerable state of affairs. We believe the recognition of this fact, whether the outcomes are accidental or intentional, demands, morally demands, a response. If the policy outcomes are accidental, it is inhuman to fail to reflect on how they may be prevented. If the policy outcomes are intentional, it is inhuman to fail to confront them and attempt to undermine their effects.
As we see it, we have not discharged our responsibilities. It is a difficult question what one must do or say in order to fulfill one’s obligations. It is an even more difficult question, given our disparate stations and geographical locations, what activity we can share to fulfill our collective responsibilities. This is why we pursue this project Interventions: it offers us an opportunity to do something to jointly face up to and bear the responsibilities we believe we have. Our forum is not intended merely to express our ideas in agreement or disagreement with institutional policies, but for stimulating discussion about issues crucial to imagining a more just world. For this reason, all comments, observations, and general feedback from our readers will be welcome.
The general orientation of this forum is domestic and global justice, and our intention is to fill the lacunae between uncritical journalism and theoretical abstraction.
--Editors
