Saturday, February 2, 2008

Are we all responsible? by Matias Bulnes, NYC

Over the last few years we have witnessed a number of measures carried out by George W. Bush’s administration in the name of US national security. To say the least, some of these measures lay on the verge of the overtly immoral and arguably illegal. It defies reason that some people react with surprise to accusations against Bush’s government of using or endorsing illegitimate means to pursue its political ends. I might conceive (although not without difficulty) that such accusations could end up being dismissed upon serious debate. But it just escapes my imagination that the denial of both prisoner’s rights and habeas corpus to those hitherto suspects of terrorism held in Guantanamo could be considered routinely moral and legal. That’s like trying to hide the sun with one finger.

But I do not intend to raise accusations already made. The point I want to make here surpasses Bush’s administration and even surpasses the US and the present time. I’m concerned with the role of citizens as passive witnesses of actions they find heinous done in their name and under their authorization. I’m concerned with our political responsibility as passive witnesses of atrocities being done in our name by our government.


Many of us are of the opinion that some of Bush’s measures to fight the Islamic threat are immoral. In fact, I daresay that most of us believe that the immorality of the situation in Guantanamo or of the recently uncovered Extraordinary Rendition policy is simply incontestable. But fewer would voice their opinion publicly and even fewer do anything to actively hinder these allegedly hideous actions. We rather turn to the comfort of our homes and personal lives than having to face the uncritical mob of Bush’s supporters.

Convenient though it is, this passiveness does not free us of political responsibility. After all, we all participate in this tacit contract we call the US society which defines the roles each of us plays in the political structure, including the democratically elected authorities—in particular, the federal government. In virtue of this tacit contract, the government’s authority to do everything it does comes from each one of us for as long as it does it in our name, that is, for as long as the government is uncorrupted and democratic. Since I want to believe that Bush’s government is uncorrupted, I shall believe that it does what it does in my name and under my tacit authorization. And if I’m partially the source of its political authority and power, I must accept a share of the political responsibility in its actions.

And so must all citizens; even those who didn’t vote for Bush. For it is essential to a democratic system that the state must be neutral with regard to the various subgroups within the society, be them religious, political, etc. All citizens should (and expect to) count the same in the government’s motivation to pursue the well-being of the nation, regardless of their political affiliation and so regardless of whether they voted for it. Hence, it is implicit in a democratic system that supporters and opponents of the government are to the same extent the partial reason of the government’s actions and so they all are in an important sense responsible for them.

I think that we have recognized this fact in the recent history. After World War II, Germany as a whole, not only Hitler’s supporters, undertook political sanctions for the Holocaust. And in fact it would have seemed unjust if those passive witnesses of the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime went unpunished. For oftentimes their apathy was not rooted in ignorance of Hitler’s extreme views but in the comfort of knowing themselves to be the ultimate beneficiaries of Hitler’s political and military actions. The political structure they willingly participated in makes them be better described as accomplices than innocent witnesses.

This is not, of course, to say that all members of a society have the exact same degree of responsibility in the actions of their government. In fact, there can be little doubt that some members of the Bush administration have a double share of responsibility: like all US citizens, for participating in the social contract; and unlike most US citizens, for having devised such hideous ways of pursuing the well-being of the US. In general, supporters of Bush’s questionable policies differ from apathetic citizens in that they facilitate the political climate to conduct such policies. Hence, they seem to be more responsible, though not the only ones responsible.

Now one thing is to bear responsibility on a certain immoral action; another quite different is to deserve to die for it. In no way do I want to suggest that the responsibility borne by an average American gives Islamic terrorists the right to kill her, as in fact they did on 9/11. For one thing, though I’m inclined to think that non-combatants should never be targeted by military forces there is a whole literature on this issue and I’m not prepared to defend any position. For another, I don’t want to begin to loose the tenure I’m yet to get before I even go out to the job market—as similar suggestions prompted Ward Churchill’s loss of his tenure.

But whatever our moral desert, the important question is how to get rid of the responsibility that yields it. And it should seem indeed very tragic if breaking the social contract were our only chance. For as far as I can see, individuals can break the contract in one of two ways: renouncing their citizenship and moving to another country; or acting in ways that explicitly violate their political duties. Both seem unreasonable and what’s worse, both seem to no avail.

Is it then in our fate to carry this moral burden? No, if the previous analysis is correct. Recall that the source of our basic responsibility is our being in some important sense the partial reason for these actions, in virtue of the tacit social contract we participate in. Hence becoming at the same time a reason against these courses of action within the limits of the social contract should counteract the basic responsibility. If, for example, an individual were to participate in legitimate public demonstrations against those actions, if she were to articulate and express cogent reasons against them, or if only she publicly expressed her dissent, all the same she would be giving the government reasons, political and/or moral, not to pursue those courses of action. Should an individual do this with enough eagerness, at the end of the day it would seem unjust to blame her for the outcomes, even if her efforts did not suffice to stop the immoral actions.

In sum, I believe there is hope for us moral citizens who deem Bush’s actions illegitimate. Not only do we have a chance to purge our guilt but it is our moral duty to do so. I have written this article as an attempt to fulfill mine.

2 Comments:

Anonymous said...

On the whole, I am sympathetic with much of what was said in this article. However, I am not sure that I am in complete agreement.
Bulnes says that we have a "moral duty" to "purge our guilt", and he suggests a few ways of doing so in the second to last paragraph. All of the things that he suggests that people can do are connected to the particular cause of expressing opposition to foreign policy decisions in fighting this "war on terrorism". He seems to be suggesting that there is a moral duty to do something significant in opposition to these particular government policies and actions.
Now consider the following case. Joe is a professor at a community college in New York, and he teaches three sections of a Critical Thinking course. He enjoys this work, but also does it because he believes that helping to improve critical thinking skills is important and helps to make the world somewhat better by helping people to become better "consumers of ideas". In addition, he is active in an organization that fights for the rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered people. He works very hard and is often quite tired, but when he gets a chance he volunteers at a local soup kitchen.
Now, should we say that in addition to all of this he has a duty to perform some significant action in opposition to US foreign policy? It seems that Bulnes would have to say that he does have this duty, which implies that if he does not put forth some opposition, this would be a moral failing. But this seems wrong. After all, Joe is a benevolent individual, concerned about his fellow human beings, and he often tries to engage in actions to help people and further important social causes. He is not passive. He is working hard and doing a lot of good, and there are only so many hours in a day.
I agree with Bulnes that we must resist injustice. But there is much injustice out there, and I'm not sure that people should be faulted for picking their battles.

Matias Bulnes said...

First of all, my main point is about responsibility. True, life is short and one has to pick one's battles. Perhaps life is so short that there's no time to fight in all fronts, and eventually one has to let one or two responsibilities go. Fine. But the responsibilities remain.

Secondly, I think our burden of responsibility for what's going on in Irak is particularly stringent. After all, unlike some other mischiefs in the world (e.g. famine in Africa) the US is indisputably responsible for most of the suffering that Irakis have undertaken as result of the war. Accordingly, this should be a top moral priority for US citizens.

I believe that if all Americans were exclusively worried about their internal problems (e.g. gay rights, poverty, etc.) while their government is vandalizing another country, the citizens of that country would probably feel enormous contempt for Americans--and rightfully so.

Finally, the kind of duties I claim we have in order to purge our guilt are not that hard to meet. I mention as one way of doing it, expressing dissent publicly. By this I don't mean that we have to appear on national TV expressing our views. After all, very few have this kind of access to massive media. I mean that we should be attentive to what our government does and be willing to attach to one's figure (however public) repudiation for the government's policies every time one finds them hideous. This is what it takes to be a citizen, a political being, a party in the social contract. All I'm saying is that, contrary to popular understanding, being a political agent in society (i.e. politically participating in it) can in some cases be a duty rather than a right.

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